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144 
DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE USE OF RACIAL 
PROXIES IN POST-MCRI ADMISSIONS 
Matthew S. Owen & Danielle S. Barbour* † 
The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”) amended the Michigan 
Constitution to provide that public universities, colleges, and school districts 
may not “discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any indi-
vidual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin 
in the operation of . . . public education.” We argue that, in addition to pro-
hibiting the overt use of racial preferences in admissions, the MCRI also 
prohibits using racial proxies such as socioeconomic status or a “Ten Per-
cent Plan” that aim to prefer minorities in admissions. 
Though the MCRI does not expressly say so, we stipulate for this paper 
that its language prohibits universities from overtly considering race in any 
way when making admissions decisions. It remains unclear, however, what 
other conduct might be barred by the MCRI. In particular, it is unsettled 
whether the MCRI would prohibit using proxies or other race-neutral crite-
ria designed to aid minority candidates in admissions. Would a plan similar 
to the “Texas Ten Percent Plan,” which accepts all in-state students who 
graduate at the top of their high school classes, violate the MCRI as a proxy 
for racial preference? What about giving applicants a bonus for socioeco-
nomic disadvantage or overcoming adversity? Does purpose matter? These 
questions are vital to universities trying to achieve racial diversity in a post-
MCRI world. The answers will depend mostly on how state courts interpret 
the MCRI’s language on “discrimination” and “preferential treatment.” 
We contend that using proxies for race would violate the MCRI. Like 
Justice Souter (dissenting in Gratz v. Bollinger), we believe using disguised 
proxies creates a system in which “the winners are the ones who hide the 
ball.” To demonstrate how legal challenges to the use of proxies might be 
resolved, we first set out the analytical framework courts should use when 
approaching these questions. We then explain why the use of racial proxies 
is impermissible under the MCRI.  
I. Choosing the Right Standard 
Because the MCRI is new law, courts need to give its language 
interpretive meaning. As a practical matter, they must decide whether the 
MCRI modifies an existing body of law (e.g., state civil rights law or equal 
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protection jurisprudence), and to what extent they must fashion a new body 
of law to give it force. We consider and reject one possible rule that sees the 
MCRI as a limited modification to equal protection jurisprudence under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As explained below, we believe the MCRI modifies 
existing state anti-discrimination law. Therefore, courts should import 
Michigan law’s disparate treatment and impact standards to admissions 
policies challenged under the MCRI.  
The first possible rule, which we reject, sees the MCRI as a limit on 
state action otherwise authorized by Grutter v. Bollinger. Under this view, 
courts would interpret the MCRI as a slight modification to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Michigan could no longer argue that the use of racial classifi-
cations, a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause, should 
nevertheless pass strict scrutiny if they are narrowly tailored to the compel-
ling state interest in diversity. This interpretation would put Michigan after 
the MCRI in the same position as Texas after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Hopwood v. Texas, which invalidated affirmative action on equal protection 
grounds. But this interpretation, by relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
asymmetrical treatment of minority and majority racial groups, would per-
mit the purposeful use of proxies or something like the “Texas Ten Percent 
Plan,” whose constitutionality the Court acknowledged in Gratz. 
The MCRI’s text does not support this interpretation. First, there is al-
ways an obvious peril in allowing the meaning of a state constitutional 
amendment to be dictated entirely by its catalysts rather than its words—an 
interpretive tool without limits. But more importantly, we believe the 
MCRI’s language supports applying the basic framework of Michigan civil 
rights laws as they now exist. The MCRI speaks not of equal protection, but 
of “discrimination” and “treatment”—the vocabulary of anti-discrimination 
laws. Also, critically, its remedies section provides as follows: 
The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, re-
gardless of the injured party’s race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, 
as are otherwise available for violations of Michigan anti-discrimination 
law. 
This direct reference to state civil rights law (the Elliot-Larsen Civil 
Rights Act) and the civil-rights language militate against reading the MCRI 
as a narrow provision overruling Grutter. Instead, it creates a new state con-
stitutional right to be free from state discrimination. And through its 
juxtaposition of favorable and unfavorable discrimination and promise of 
equal access to remedies, the MCRI requires symmetrical treatment for all 
racial groups. 
II. Disparate Impact and Proxies for Race 
Established Michigan law already prohibits many kinds of discrimina-
tion against racial groups through the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 
which—like its federal counterpart—recognizes two theories of recovery for 
racial discrimination in employment and education: “disparate treatment” 
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and “disparate impact.” Michigan courts often interpret the state act as con-
forming to the federal version, and thus we will treat both as relevant and 
persuasive authority. 
The same analytical framework applies to both state and federal anti-
discrimination law. A plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination through “dis-
parate treatment” in the employment context must show that an employer’s 
facially disparate treatment of employees of different races is motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose. “Disparate impact” requires the plaintiff to show 
that the consequences of a particular policy fall more harshly on a protected 
class, and that the employer cannot justify the policy by business necessity. 
Under Michigan law, proof of an impermissible purpose is not required to 
recover on the disparate impact theory. 
Given this framework, one could argue that MCRI only bans policies 
that facially prefer candidates by race, because its language only refers to 
“preferential treatment” (we call this the “Facial Only Reading”). If the 
word “treatment” must have meaning, its meaning must be that—in contrast 
to discrimination—the only preferences MCRI prohibits are those mani-
fested through disparate treatment. This construction would achieve the 
same result as Hopwood, allowing proxies for race like the “Ten Percent 
Plan,” because these admissions policies are facially neutral. 
The fundamental flaw with the Facial Only Reading is that it tries to 
draw a novel distinction between preferential treatment and discrimination. 
While giving each word of a statute independent meaning is an ordinary 
principle of statutory construction, it is inappropriate here, where both terms 
already have a settled meaning. Preferential treatment has always been dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court noted in Griggs v. Duke Power Company 
that “discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is pre-
cisely and only what [civil rights legislation] has proscribed.” Thus, trying to 
give separate meaning to these two terms is a fruitless exercise that need-
lessly complicates the interpretive undertaking. Rather, the outcome of a 
challenge under the MCRI turns on three questions: (1) whether the MCRI 
distinguishes between majority and minority groups; (2) how a prima facie 
case of discrimination in admissions may be shown; (3) how that prima fa-
cie case may be rebutted. Because, as noted above, we do not believe the 
MCRI distinguishes between racial groups, we turn to the latter two ques-
tions. 
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 
MCRI by showing that a particular admissions has a disparate impact on his 
racial group. The MCRI prohibits “discrimination against” racial groups, 
and its symmetry requirement ensures that this protection is available to all 
applicant-plaintiffs. Because the MCRI does not say “discriminatory treat-
ment” but merely “discrimination,” we can infer that it imports the disparate 
impact theory of recovery for discrimination currently available under state 
law. This theory would apply to suits by whites challenging the use of race-
neutral admissions plans.  
We also believe that it would be appropriate for Michigan courts to re-
quire proof of a discriminatory motive in a disparate impact case, much like 
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in equal protection jurisprudence. This requirement would permit universi-
ties to use good-faith admissions criteria that are genuinely race-oblivious 
without having courts decide what admissions factors are really important, 
and which are too trivial to justify discrimination. 
Under both state and federal anti-discrimination laws, once the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case of a disparate impact, the burden would shift 
to the defendant university to prove that the challenged practice is justified 
by business necessity—a kind of heightened scrutiny. How might a court 
apply this scrutiny in the MCRI context?  
When rebutting a prima facie case, a defendant university might argue 
that its use of racial proxies passes heightened scrutiny because it has the 
legitimate purpose of achieving diversity by favoring minorities in admis-
sions. This argument is consistent with traditional interpretations of civil 
rights laws that also permitted overt racial preferences. But because we do 
not find in the MCRI any basis for a diversity-seeking exception, we think a 
proxy clearly motivated by racial diversity will not justify discriminatory 
preference. 
First, Congressional intent, the typical basis for permitting a goal of di-
versity under Title VI, in inapplicable to an MCRI analysis. Proponents of 
the Facial Only Reading would look to the definition of “discrimination” 
and accompanying standard of review under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 
which applies to university admissions. As an initial step, this is perfectly 
logical. The Supreme Court has held that affirmative action in university 
admissions does not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act unless it also 
violates the Constitution because “discrimination” under that Title is coter-
minous with the Equal Protection Clause. Leeway for disparate treatment in 
favor of minority groups under Title VI goes to constitutional limits. But the 
basis for this interpretation—which comes from Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke and which the Court reaffirmed in Grutter—is that Con-
gress intended discrimination under Title VI to mean “constitutionally 
impermissible discrimination.” This logic cannot be a sound method for in-
terpreting “discrimination” under the MCRI because, quite obviously, 
Congress did not write the MCRI. Its basic purpose—to end the use of oth-
erwise constitutional racial preferences—is much different than Title VI’s 
aim: to enforce existing constitutional limits. There is no reason to import 
those exceptions to outlawed discrimination that are based solely on legisla-
tive intent to a popular referendum. Further, defining MCRI discrimination 
by the very cases it overrules—Bakke and Grutter—would be untenably 
perverse. 
Moreover, in case you were hungry for reductio ad absurdum, using the 
“constitutional” standard to inform the interpretation of “discrimination” in 
the MCRI would vitiate its purpose. If discrimination means “unconstitutional 
discrimination,” why wouldn’t preferential treatment mean “unconstitutional 
preferential treatment?” And since limited racial preferences in admissions 
don’t violate the constitution, they shouldn’t violate the MCRI either. We 
know that can’t be right, so we must look elsewhere for a standard of review. 
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Unlike the federal Civil Rights Act, which is separated into different Ti-
tles for education, employment, race, gender, etc., each with its own 
developed and often different jurisprudence, the MCRI makes a blanket 
statement. By banning discrimination or preference in “public employment, 
public education, or public contracting,” the MCRI most plausibly intends 
that there be one standard for all of these areas. Thus, even if federal law 
were an appropriate place to look for a standard of review, it is not obvious 
that Title VI (as opposed to Title VII, for example, which deals with em-
ployment discrimination) would be the right source. Once outside the safe 
harbor of Title VI’s “limits of the Constitution” standard, affirmative action 
programs encounter a tougher review from courts, especially where their 
sole purpose is to achieve and maintain racial diversity. For example, in Title 
VII’s employment context, when a prima facie case of “reverse discrimina-
tion” has been made, the Third Circuit has held that an employer’s 
affirmative action program is invalid under Title VII where it aims to pro-
mote diversity rather than to remedy discrimination. Even the exception for 
remedial programs under Title VII is largely based on Congressional intent, 
which is absent from the MCRI.  
We note the example above from the Third Circuit not because we think 
Title VII is obviously the right source from which to import a standard of 
review for the MCRI. In fact, it could not be: remedial affirmative action is 
unconstitutional in state school admissions unless the institution itself has a 
history of discrimination. Rather, we find the example illustrative because it 
demonstrates the slim margin by which universities can use racial prefer-
ences. In a recent opinion terminating an injunction delaying the 
enforcement of the MCRI, the Sixth Circuit observed that using racial pref-
erences in admissions is something universities only “narrowly may do” 
under the Constitution. The MCRI is much broader than the narrow lan-
guage necessary to overrule Grutter (“means of achieving the goal of 
diversity must be facially neutral”). It is far too blunt an instrument to make 
so fine a cut: carving out the barely constitutional practice of candidly pre-
ferring racial minorities in admissions, but nothing more. Instead, it creates 
a new, colorblind regime for state involvement with race in Michigan. That 
has consequences beyond simply doing away with overt preferences. 
